The original story:
‘Post-normal science’ is perfect for climate demagogues — it isn’t science at all.
James Delingpole
The Spectator
10 March 2010

Summary of the story:
Here are some clips from Mr Delingpole’s artice:

Background:

[It is  widely assumed]…… there must be some truth in this man-made global warming thing — or why else would so many scientists believe in it?

(1) On Karl Popper and the falsification principle

Science is never settled. That’s not how it works. ‘The science’ is no more nor less than a series of hypotheses, none of which lasts any longer than it takes some impertinent, iconoclastic upstart to come along, prove it wrong, and replace it with some fancy new improved hypothesis of his own.

(2) On Thomas Khun and Paradigm Shift

The paradigm is the current, more-or-less universally accepted world-view held by the scientific community. A shift takes place when ‘anomalies’ are niggled away at by a growing body of dissenting scientists, leading to a period of uncertainty and foment (‘crisis’), which in turn leads to the creation of a new paradigm.

In the last decade there has been a paradigm shift over AGW. Or rather there would have been, had not a powerful and unscrupulous cabal in the scientific community refused to allow science to progress in the normal way.

(3) On Jerry Ravetz, Mike Hulme and Post Normal Science

In 1991 a Marxist philosopher called Jerome R. Ravetz had helped to invent a seductive and dangerous new concept called ‘post-normal science’ (PNS). No longer was it considered essential that scientists strive after objectivity….

Post-normal science and the AGW movement were made for one another. No need for any of that tedious objectivity; no need for careful observation or the risk of frustration through falsification. All that mattered now was the quality of the ‘narrative’, the scariness of the future scenarios cooked up by computer models which — as the hockey stick curve demonstrated — could predict for you whatever you wanted them to predict.

Hulme once wrote: ‘The function of climate change I suggest, is not as a lower-case environmental phenomenon to be solved… It really is not about stopping climate chaos. Instead, we need to see how we can use the idea of climate change — the matrix of ecological functions, power relationships, cultural discourses and materials flows that climate change reveals — to rethink how we take forward our political, social, economic and personal projects over the decades to come.’

livingissues comment:

(1) On Karl Popper and the falsification principle

It is true that “science is never settled” and indeed proceeds by offering up theories and hypotheses which stand until they are knocked down. Popper’s idea was that an idea only had meaning and a proposition could only be a statement of fact if it was capable of being proved wrong. Delingpole misjudges the statements of climate scientists if he supposes that they suppose they are not in principle capable of being proved wrong. 

(2) On Thomas Khun and Paradigm Shift

It is true that Khun advanced an important idea about how science is done, namely that  its theories tend to operate under a series of over-arching rationales which tend to become rather well-embedded, though are usually – if wrong – shifted in the end. Over time, all sorts of evidence accretes which cracks the shell of certainty (see how tectonic plate theory took time to get a grip as a good example).

Actually climate change science at heart makes quite simple, quite small assumptions about very large processes. That’s to say, that adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere tends to warm the planet. It then – quite seperately – says that such warming can now be observed. And then (less certainly) it says that various current climate effects can be attributed to these processes. And then it suggests where the warming may lead us.  The big “paradigm” here is about physics and chemistry, and no-one is yet saying that the existing paradigms in those fields are very likely to be wrong. New theories and ideas and evidence may come along and quite easily shift our understanding of climate change without any paradigms standing in the way.

(3) On Jerry Ravetz, Mike Hulme and Post Normal Science

Post Normal Science may or not be a typically modern or post modern piece of windy talk. Insofar as it makes sense, Mike Hulme (who is something of a fan of Post Normal Science) actually insists that both sides of the argument ought to understand it better. Hulme, using Post Normal Science thinking in a way which ought to appeal to Delingpole, says that scientists often have cultural prejudices which influence their work; ought to understand how forceful their prejudices are; ought to understand that they are often asked to answer questions which are really political; and are seldom good at spotting all sorts of complexities and uncertainties in their thinking.

But all these apply as much to scientists who hate the conventional climate change science consensus as to those who promote it.

Here is a useful way into Hulme’s thinking:

We need this perspective of post-normal science if we are going to make sense of books such as Singer and Avery’s [staunch climate sceptics]. Or indeed, if we are to make sense of polar opposites such as James Lovelock’s [a staunch climate alarmist] recent contribution The Revenge of Gaia, in which he extends climate science to reach the conclusion that the collapse of civilisation is no more than a couple of generations away.

The original story:
“Turkey mourns dead Gaza activists”
BBC Online
4 June 2010

Summary of the story:
The BBC reports on  Turkish mourners at the funerals of the “nine activists killed in Israel’s raid on a Gaza aid flotilla”. It then went on to major on the reaction of the Turkish government and the activists. It mentioned that the Israeli’s believed the ships were aiming to break the contoversial Israeli blockade of Gaza.

livingissues comment:
The following comments are intended to be valid whatever the reader thinks about the state of play between the Israeli government and the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip. Equally, they don’t depend on one’s point of view as to Israel’s blockade of Gaza. 

Israel offered to let the ships fulfill their aid mission by unloading most of their material at a port of the government’s choosing. So had the delivery of aid been the flotilla’s primary ambition, it could have been achieved without difficulty. So it is unlikely that this was primarily an “aid” mission.

It seems silly of the Israeli’s to pretend that the ships had a terrorist ambition as some spokesmen claimed. It isn’t even clear how the ships could seriously be thought to be attempting to break the blockade (as though forcibly), as seemed to be the Israeli’s main claim. It’s true of course that the activists wanted to break the blockade in a political sense (in the long term, for instance).

The flotilla might have been allowed through and in that sense might have “broken” the blockade. But isn’t it more likely that the flotilla intended or expected to be stopped and that there would be a lot of filmable outrage as the blockade was enforced and the aid didn’t get through to Gaza? One may say that that the Israeli’s over-reacted to resistance from some of the activists. But that’s what often happens when an armed force under-estimates the opposition and then has to retrieve the situation.  

What seems to be going on here is, in one way, quite commonplace in the world of protest: some naive, strong-headed activists get duped by people with much more sinister motives. Much protest is intended to provoke state violence, just as much terrorist activity is.  

 Also, of course, the level of violence contemplated by the hard-nuts on the Mavi Maramar was quite different to most protests. But this case is complicated by the involvement of the Turkish authorities. This seems almost to have been a government stunt by proxy.

The original stories:
“No Surrender”
The corporation will become smaller, but no less potent
The Economist
6 March 2010

“The BBC’s retreat may yet turn into a rout”
Losing a few digital stations and web pages will not be enough to keep the licence fee off the political agenda
David Elstein
The Times
4 March 2010

Summary of the stories:
The Economist made the usual noises about the BBC being a remarkable broadcaster and admired by Britons who broadly accept the licence fee they have to pay a little nonsensically since it’s supposed to be premised on buying the right to watch TV, though many watch relatively little of the corporation’s output. The magazine pointed out that the BBC is a bigger success with older people and the middle classes than with the young and less well-off. In response, the BBC has over the years expanded into hep digital radio and TV stations, and into the web. It noted that the BBC’s new strategy seems to be to head-off criticism that it crowds into markets where it threatens burgeoning commercial competitors. Its says  future it will concentrate on its core, home-made, high quality material. 

David Elstein’s piece covered much the same ground as The Economist but with the significant difference that Mr Elstein thinks that the BBC’s strategy may “backfire”:

“Paradoxically, a more efficient BBC spending more on content may strike its competitors as even more of a threat than its current incarnation.”

livingissues comment:
For a free market and socially libertarian magazine, The Economist is surprisingly friendly toward the state’s involvement in the funding and behaviour of the BBC. David Elstein has a record of being much more sceptical (not least in a ground-breaking review he chaired for the Conservative Party). He was writing for The Times which is regarded as being anti-BBC not least because it is owned by Ruper Murdoch, whose Sky is one of the BBC’s most important competitors.

It’s useful to remember that the BBC needs both to be high quality and even elite in its material whilst also offering a wide range of mass market material. It needs to appeal to everyone or its political support will disappear. In current circusmtances, as Mr Edelstein catches better than the Economist, it can’t please anyone very easily. When competes better in the elite market, it makes it even harder for commercial stations to offer work in this non-commercial arena, and when it sticks to its populist guns, it is robbing the commercial sector of viewers which are all the more badly needed in a recession (which has seen advertising revenues fall).

In short, in bad times, the BBC looks even more like a spoiled and protected monolith than it does in good times. Of course, the BBC retains a large amount of political support, partly because the public  likes and more or less trusts it, and partly because it’s quite cheap, and partly because voters hang on nanny for fear of something worse. 

All the same, the funding system is unfair (it penalises the poor). Besides, bit by bit, a more radical argument gains traction: the state should stop controlling the broadcasters (there are more legal controls on broadcasting than any other media) as though they had a unique power to corrupt or defile us. This is especially true the more satellite and cable platforms give viewers access to a huge range of material from around the world. The more time one spends not “consuming” BBC shows, the less one is inclined to continue to pay for them.

[The editor of this site in 2007 wrote "Scrap the BBC!": Ten years to set broadcasters free]

The original story:
“Has capitalist ideology failed us?”
BBC Radio 4 Today Programme (listen again)
23 November 2009, 08.55hrs

Summary of the story:
The Today programme set up their “listen-again” with this blurb:

In his new book How Markets Fail, John Cassidy claims that the economic calamity of 2008 did not shatter principles of capitalism as there is not a static set of capitalist principles to destroy. John Cassidy and Executive vice chair of the Work Foundation, Will Hutton, debate who got it most wrong in the Credit Crunch.

John Cassidy argues that we are at a turning point after 30-odd years of Thatcherite Reaganism which discredits “ultra versions” of the free market especially as applied to financial markets. Will Hutton said that it had been a “giant intellectual mistake” to think that while markets work some of the time, they could work all the time.  Alan Greenspan, both contributors thought, was at the centre of all this, based on an ideological view of how markets work. The result is a “vast problem for Britain”. JC said we would “row back” from the extremes of the market view. WH said that there’s a lot of new economic thinking springing up without a clear left right view and a new interest in behavioural economics. JC finished with the remark that Adam Smith’s view that “we can all leave it to the market has been discredited.”

livingissues comment:
It is certainly true that a good deal of commentary suggests that we are re-evaluating free markets. We are revisiting the idea that markets are in equilibrium, that economic players are both rational and selfish, that deregulation is good. It is also often said that John Maynard Keynes has been returned to favour and Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek are out of it and that fiscal intervention not monetarism are the order of the day.

However, it is only fair to say that “old” economics has been discussing all these themes for a very long time and there is no particular hope that some new style of the discipline will spring up and solve ancient problems. For instance, whilst “behavioural” economics does indeed discuss economic players who have consciences and moods, old economics itself spent a good deal of time discussing, for instance, the mood swings which afflict markets. I’m thinking of Keynes’s “animal spirits” and the reviled Greenspan’s “irrational exuberance”, just to cite two sources thought to be at opposite ends of the spectrum.

It is true that market theory discusses the idea of a crowd of perfectly-informed players producing a market-clearing price in a way which can’t be bettered. But even market enthusiasts accept that all players are not likely to be equally well-informed, and that markets are not all-wise (for a start there are “market failures” to do with “externalities” such as environmental issues (which the market doesn’t price properly).

Even though its own fans acknowledge that the free market is richer, weirder and less perfect than theory suggests, in the current crisis they stress that financial breakdowns  like the present really might have been avoided if the markets had been freer. In short, financial institutions took risks in part because they were encouraged by governments to do so. There was, for instance, a surplus of cheap money, a surfeit of government encouragement (and even a tacit guarantee) of “bad” loans to customers (who were also voters) who were not good risks.  Besides, the banks fooled themselves that new-fangled and complex financial instruments were safe. This was a mistake which flowed from their not being rational enough market players who ruthlessly sought full information because failure would have been fatal to their own livelihoods. A truly free market would have kept them more fearful and lot less trusting.

In short, it is not as clear as some commentators suggest that there was once an all-powerful freemarket ideology which created a colossal danger and which now be over-ridden in favour of a more statist, enriched, socialised capitalism which would be vigorous, attractive, safe and responsible.

The original story:
“American journalism needs public support”
Leonard Downie
Financial Times
21 October 2009

Summary of the story:
Leonard Downie, a veteran senior journalist, not least with the Washington Post, argues that there is an interesting response to the crisis afflicting the US newspaper market. Funded from all sorts of sources (and even their own pockets), journalists are putting their own journalism, and that of colleagues of many sorts, online. Furthermore, some bloggers - with diverse sources of funding (and none) are putting good journalism on their sites.  

Downie argues that the many varied sorts of funding for this work should include some sort of state subvention too.

livingissues comment:

There is much to celebrate here. The implication is that journalists can:

(1) sometimes become profit-centres in their own right;
(2) usually get their stuff out there very cheaply;
(3) be funded directly to create their journalism.

As Downie says, everyone from universities to philanthropists and special interest groups can fund this new model.

More generally:
We might want to remember that the future of opinion journalism is much less problematic than the future of news-gathering and investigation. Very good opinion can be produced free or is very easy to pay for (by appreciative users of blogs, for instance).

News is not necessarily expensive: many bodies from law courts to firms to armies can produce high quality and invaluable material for virtually no cost and in their own or the public interest. Much of this can be reaily assessed for its accuracy, and outlets will soon gain or lose reputations for accuracy.

But much news is very expensive to produce and the many new outlets may benefit from sort of professional quality monitoring.

Mr Downie’s own piece suggests that there are lots of ways putting that funding in place.(I have argued elsewhere for a National Media Trust).

One could argue that Mr Downie is quite wrong to reach for state support for this burgeoning process. The state’s influence would be stodgy and tend to the monolithic. It could be argued, surely, that this is a case where society could gain strength by informing itself by the involvement of as many voluntary or market sources as possible?

The original story:
“Disadvantaged children failed by British system, warns OECD”
Strapline: Britain’s education and welfare system is failing disadvantaged children despite high levels of public funding, the OECD has warned.
The Daily Telegraph
1 September 2009

Summary of the story:
The papers – including the sensible Telegraph – have got excited by some OECD research (probably not much more than a look through existing data) which purports to show that the UK is failing the younger end of its young, and the poorer end of the younger end.

Here’s the work the papers are referring to: www.oecd.org/els/social/childwellbeing

livingissues comment:
I’ll look at the work in greater detail soon, but even a cursory glance suggests that the UK is an ordinary mid-range big European country in most ways. Our young have a pretty good school experience and are pretty safe. But they are bit hooliganish (they get drunk and have babies a bit more commonly than other rich nation kids). Most other countries seem to fail their young in more ways than we do ours. I think that’s the conclusion one comes to when looking at Table 2.1 (here: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/4/43570328.pdf).

Of course, we don’t do as well by our children as the Scandinavians. But we compare pretty well with the French and Germans. We do better than the Italians and Greeks, who famously love their children.

The original story:
“In defence of the dismal science”
Robert Lucas
The Economist
6 August 2009

Summary of the story: 
Robert Lucas, a distinguished economist, defends his trade. He argues that economists are getting better at forecasting the effects of various possible and likely future events, and better at dealing with events as they come along. He adds that the future to a large extent is a mystery and will remain one.

(Other valuable contributions to the debate came from Robert Skidelsky and Samuel Brittan, in the Financial Times, 6 August 2009.)

livingissues comment:
This is nothing like the last word on a very difficult problem. In effect, Robert Lucas seems to be saying that economists are good at dealing with economic facts provided they are known. This implies (for instance) that when a bank owns assets whose value and riskiness is unknown (as was the case with quite important chunks of bank assets in 2007 and 2008), it’s pretty hard for economics to get a grip on the banks’ situation. So predicting a banking collapse isn’t all that easy. But he goes on to say that the same sort of economics (especially the use of complex modelling) which is accused of knowing less than it thinks, actually was able to respond much better to the 2008/9 crisis than would have been the case previously. What’s more, it built on insights from Keynes and Friedman.

Some of this is in line with the kind of problem Donald Rumsfeld usefully described as he accounted for the difficulty of running a war.

 “….  as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”

It is possible to argue that economists don’t properly acknowledge how little they understand, let alone how little they know.

But they don’t need to. The general public already accepts that economists can’t all be right. We often mutter that, “Whenever there are six economists, there are six different opinions.” We are bound to be taking a risk when we pick just one of the six economist to be in charge of our fortunes, and are probably taking as big a risk when we rely on a committee of six economists.

The original story:
“Happiness Schmappiness”
David Aaronovitch
The Times
11 August 2009

Summary of the story:
David Aaronovitch has been an important contributor to the Happiness Debate. In this piece he attacks a much-cited piece of work which purported to show that British children were unhappy. He does so on his familiar territories. He says the “data” employed is deployed to produce the result the researchers demand. (The UK the “worst” in the league table of countries.) He implies that the researchers are dishonest in not challenging their own findings. (They happily cite the bits of data which go with their flow, but they don’t tell us where glaring gaps in their knowledge lie.) 

livingissues comment:
It is very useful to have Mr Aaronovitch’s detailed debunking of a piece of “happiness” research, not only because it’s an important debate about well-being but also because the reading public need to know how to interrogate this kind of material in whatever debate it’s employed.

The original story:
“It’s not Facebook that’s doing down our young”
David Aaronovitch
The Times
4 August 2009

Summary of the story:
Mr Aaronovitch looks at a piece of work by one commentator. He writes:

“Modern society was so bad, this declinist wrote, that one study showed how girls …. thought so little of themselves that the number answering that they saw themselves as a ‘worthless person’ had gone up threefold in 20 years. This was awful.”

Mr Aaronivitch said that the declinist then went on to cite Jean Twenge, author of Generation Me and The Narcissism Epidemic as having part of the answer. Twenge said modern young people have an “exaggerated and selfish idea of their own importance”. Between the 1950s and the 1980s there was an increase from 12 to 80 percent in the number of people who agree with the proposition, “I am an important person”.

According to Mr Aaronivtch, the Facebook generation mostly face the problem (not of TV or Pop Idol), but the

“determined – almost ruthless – cultural pessimism of some of their spiritual, academic and commentating elders.”

livingissues comment:
It is certainly true, as Mr Aaronovitch says, that modern gurus often cite evidence which is extraordinarily self-contradictory without any hint that both arguments can’t be true.

However. It is of course possible that modern young people are a bit contradictory. One could argue, for instance, that they have a sky-high but very fragile opinion of themselves. That is: they believe (because everyone tells them so) that they matter, can succeed, and ought not to defer to anyone. On the other hand, when they do fail this becomes an amazing surprise because they have no conception that if they aim low and attempt nothing they will be failures and if they do attempt things, and aim high, sooner or later they will over-reach themsleves, and fail.

In short, they do of course matter but they will fail. So it may be that they need to be told that one is bound to feel a bit worthless unless one has a very realistic understanding that success is quite rare, that life is a battle. In short, they may need a little modesty. On the other hand, too much modesty can be demotivating.

Life’s a muddle and it takes courage. To that extent, saying contradictory things about life (and young people) is inevitable. So one might refine Mr Aaronivitch’s analysis to this extent: he might have added that being contradictory is inevitable, but one ought to admit it. But that makes one’s writing rather nuanced, and it is probably the case that modern academics and commentators feel the need to make a large splash.

The original story:
“Lord Rogers’ attack on the Prince of Wales is outlandish”
Telegraph View
Daily Telegraph
17 June 2009

Summary of the story:

A crisp Teleraph leader opines that Lord Rogers is wrong to criticise Prince Charles’s intervention which led to the Qatari power elite pulling out of a London architectural scheme they were funding.

livingissues comment:

It is possible that the majority of people don’t like the Rogers scheme which Charles has scuppered. But it got through the democratically-mandated planning system ordained by the the British people speaking through Parliament. If people don’t like the scheme, they need to use the existing system. If they don’t like the system they need to fight to change it.

Of course, Charles can’t argue for those sorts of changes except discreetly. Not that being argumentative is his game. As Lord Rogers says, and it’s a secondary issue: Charles never debates the issues he chunders on about. Maybe his opining from on high is the luxury we have to allow him granted that he has watch his words (at least a bit).

But we really should not permit to Charles to stitch things up behind our backs: that is a serious abuse of his being heir to a constitutional monarchy.

More to the point, it’s amazing to think that the Daily Telegraph doesn’t see any of that and would rather celebrate the outcome of Charles’s intervention because architecturally it suits them. Oh, and theirs is the populist view – which again is hardly the point of a being an intelligent right-winger.