(1) The caveat.  

The next months of severe weather may produce horrible new auguries. We’ll see. If the Macondo spill is or causes or triggers an unparalleled ecological disaster all bets are off. However, even if the Gulf suffers quite severe effects, there will be a colossal argument as to how much of the damage is from the present spill. It may be that the conclusion settles down to this: the Gulf has needed better care for several decades, and there is a limit to how much BP should made to pay for historic damage which its accident has worsened.

(2) It is likely that BP was in the process of becoming, under Tony Hayward, more of an engineering company. The next few months will reveal the degree to which this was true, and if, and then why, this message failed to reach the Macondo operation. It doesn’t seem very likely that BP was very far from being as technically competent and as safety-conscious as other majors. 

(3) It is likely that all oil companies will have to prove themselves increasingly safety-aware, just as all regulators will have to show themselves cleverer at their work. This will impose new costs on exploration and much else. But these won’t be transformative, surely?

(4) If BP loses its current CEO and Chairman, or either one, as sacrifical lambs, that may slightly effect the company for better or worse, but in itself wouldn’t be a transformation.

(5) As BP cashes in some assets to fund its liabilities in the Macondo aftermath, that may improve rather than damage its financial prospects (make it a more coherent or profitable firm, for instance). It may not amount to a transformation so much as a valuable readjustment.   

(6) In the bigger picture I can’t see how the Macondo spill will hugely change the logic of the USA’s desire to shift from a 60-odd percent oil import dependency and back to the historic 30 percent dependency. The foreign sources of oil and gas are not getting notably more secure or agreeable as the years pass. The spill won’t much dent the US’s appetite for home-sourced oil.

(7) People who want the US to embrace high-cost fossil fuels as a response to climate change have latched onto the Macondo spill though damage to the Gulf Coast is not related to climate change (or not much, yet). Even if the link was made, and the US citizen accepted a tax-hike to European levels (none of which is immediately probable), demand for oil would be high, and demand for Gulf oil (including deep-sea Gulf oil) would surely be barely dented.

(8) Taxing fuel is a tense political business. The UK adds about 70 percent in taxes to oil prices and the US about 25 percent. So notionally there’s room for manoeuvre in the US. But politicians usually set taxes at levels which maximise revenue, or at least optimise it. Very few dare set taxes at levels which change behaviour, not least because such levels would be punitively high in political terms. And there is a further dimension: if “carbon” taxes were very high, income and employment taxes would have to be reduced, so people would feel rich and maybe rich enough to pay quite a lot of carbon tax.

(9) All in all, it isn’t clear that the Macondo spill will bring about or even much encourage the political drivers for radical transformation in the US or global oil business. BP may change hugely, but that’s far from ceratin. The accident will encourage better safety measures, maybe produce a leaner and cleverer BP, maybe spur a new health regime for the Gulf coast, maybe promote more discussion and awareness of the wider risks of the oil economy, including climate change.

(10) Meanwhile, it’s important remember the men who died in the initial explosion. More generally, I should say that I write all the above with the feeling that I hate scapegoating and grandstanding, and have a strongly believe that things do getter better almost all the time, especially in the West, and especially because we take risks and learn from our mistakes.

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Palestine Betrayed
By Efraim Karsh
Yale, 2010

Islamic  Imperialism: A history
By Efraim Karsh
Yale , paperback, 2007 (Updated edition)

Fitting my prejudices
These books deliciously confirm my prejudices about the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the middle east in general. Here are some of them. You don’t have to like the Zionists to admire them; you can’t help liking the Arab world, but it’s hard to admire it. The Zionists do sometimes fail our very high expectations of them, but the Arabs very often fail our much lower expectations of them.

It happens that I have never been to Israel or Arab Palestine, but I spent just enough time in Egypt in the mid-1980s to know that even if it has a wicked state, its citizens seem extraordinarily kind. I know: the Egyptians aren’t strictly Arab, but they’ll do for now and in any case this argument is sustained, if a little equivocally, by the weeks I spent in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait just after the first Gulf War in 1991. And in case what you are about to read seems to condemn Arabs as amiable fools, I should stress that I have a fair bit of evidence of the intelligence and professionalism of plenty of Palestinian Arabs.

All in all, it is easier to romanticise the Arabs than the Jews. That may be a surprise to some Jews, who reasonably enough see themselves as having a racial, a religious, a geographic and a historical claim to be victims. The Englishman is conditioned to respond to the underdog, and for some reason in this case that’s not the Jews. By the handy tropes of the Baby-boomer generation liberal, and their reading of Edward Said, Israel is plainly bad by being the heir to The Enlightenment, the tool of America and the standard bearer of the West. The Palestinians, on the contrary, are the heirs and prime examples of the tradition of liberation wars and rhetoric, and in a lineage which runs from Byron to Arafat via Bob Dylan and Gerry Adams. 

So you will perhaps see that when I first set my face against the tyranny of liberalism, in the 1960s, it was in Israel, Vietnam and Northern Ireland where I (metaphorically) found my greatest motivation and met my biggest tests. I’m afraid I didn’t do much historical reading, so the underpinning of my generalised affection for American and British official policy was scanty.

The Karsh enterprise
Efraim Karsh is almost obsessively in love with archive work, but he isn’t afraid of controversy. He has certainly laid into the “New History” by which some Jewish and other historians have aligned themselves with conventional anti-Zionist, pro-Arab narratives. But the most important message of Karsh’s work is not stated as such by him. His enormous quantities of evidence paint (very satisfactorily to my eyes) a picture in which the Palestinian Arabs, and the wider Arab world, threw away chance after chance to thrive alongside their Jewish neighbours. Maybe they didn’t spot that Jews make the best of friends and the worst of enemies.

The story of Arab failure
The Arab failure should not be seen as a case of a small but disastrous unawareness that they should cut their losses or make the best of a bad thing or live with a fait accompli. It was much worse
than that. Karsh cites convincing data that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the luckiest Arab – the Arab with the best deal to be had in the Middle East – was to be found living and trading alongside Jews in Palestine.  This good fortune was not, by the way, the comparative good fortune of the black African living in apartheid South Africa. The black South Africans of the mid-20th century were amongst the most – were perhaps the most – prosperous and educated Africans in the entire continent, but they suffered political indignities. By contrast, the Palestinian Arab had an absolutely solid promise and expectation of western-style, modern civil rights. The Zionists had proved themselves very benign economic neighbours, and were determined to offer Arabs a full share of the rule of law and democracy they wanted for themselves in their National Home. Even in the late 1940s, when war had hardened their hearts, the Jews maintained a large measure of this desire, and it is powerfully vestigal even now.

So who’s to blame for the failure of the Palestinian Arabs to throw their lot in with the Jews and thrive alongside them? Roughly speaking, one could say that Karsh’s two books prove that nearly any Arab with a voice has firmly grabbed the wrong end of the stick. Karsh’s Palestine Betrayed  tells us, for instance, that:

“Musa Alami, one of the foremost Palestinian Arab moderates during the mandate era, told David Ben-Gurion, ‘He would prefer the land to remain poor and desolate even for another hundred years’, if the alternative was its rapid development in collaboration with the Zionists.” 

Palestine Betrayed shows that most Arab simply could not imagine that the Zionists were so unlike (so much better than) their own power elites (such as the Arabs could be said to have had any). Arab power-brokers assumed, or pretended to assume, that the Jews would run a state which would exploit and ruin non-Jews. It is remarkable that even the “best” of the leaders of neighbouring states – those most prepared to negotiate with the proto-state of Israel – were either thoroughly anti-Semitic in their hearts, or deployed anti-Semitism whenever it suited them.  (I am using anti-Semitism to denote anti-Jewishness, though of course the Arabs are semites too.)

The only area in which I wonder if Karsh’s account is entirely secure is in his argument that Arab and Jewish communities mostly got along pretty well before 1948 and that therefore it was (he implies) almost always bad leadership which led the locals astray. There does seem to have been a deal of alacrity in the way local Arabs swung into hate mode against Jews. Perhaps there is middle ground to be had: Arab heads were always primed with anti-semitism, ready for the fuse to be lit. 

The big story of Islamic and Arab imperialism
It helps to see the context as Karsh lays it out. His Arab Imperialism shows that Muslim leaders have very often invoked the idea of a millenarian Islamic right to regional and global power, and not often done so because they were devout. In parallel to this line of thought, Arab national leaders (or Arab leaders who aspire to national power) very often invoke a pan-Arab dream, with varying degrees of Islamism, sometimes to mask their designs, and sometimes to elevate them. Certainly that was what went on in the final mid-century tragedy of the failure of Palestine.

The bigger surprise is to hear Karsh revising the usual narrative of European exploitation of the collapsing Ottoman empire. The new middle eastern boundaries and the creation of Iraq, for instance, were:

 “the aggregate outcome of intense pushing and shoving by a multitude of regional and international bidders for the Ottoman war spoils, in which the local actors, despite their marked inferiority to the great powers, often had the upper hand.”

Karsh calls this chapter, “The tail that wags the dog”.

The historiographies of the conflict
It may be useful to pause here and consider where Karsh’s approach, his historiography, differs from the kind of thing read by most students of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The mainstream modern view seems to be, or seeks to be, determinedly non-judgemental. So, for instance, Kirsten E Schultze’s The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1999 and 2008, in the classic Seminar Studies in History series) says that the conflict is of its time; “in simplistic terms, is one of competing nationalisms”.  

It’s a nice move but surely rather odd. Yes, the idea of a Jewish nation state was quite new and fitted a contemporary fashion. Yes, the Arab world was witnessing the birth of various post-colonial states. So we seem to have a nice symmetry between the Jews’ need of a post-Holocaust state and the Arabs’ need of a set of post-Ottoman, post-French, post-British national states. A parity and a moral equivalence is suggested. Also a nice post-modern relativism: Jew and Arab both had a felt need of a nation state and there’s no need to investigate the merits of their case.

Read on, and the Schultze account is similarly sure that Jews and Arabs were about equally capable of atrocity and – if anything – the Jewish role in banishing Arabs from Palestine was the greater. Well, it’s true that some Zionists were capable of atrocities, but the Arabs perpetrated far more of them. What’s more, one has to work rather hard – fly in the face of a good deal of contrary evidence – to believe that the Jews perpetrated the horrors casually ascribed to their villainy. But the infamous tragedy of Deir Yassin, usually characterised as a massacre (including by Schultze), in which Jewish underground forces killed 250 people (100 according to Karsh), was a very rare event. It was immediately denounced by official Jewish authorities and seized on as a propaganda tool by the Arabs. As for the exodus of Palestinian Arabs before, during and after the 1948 war, it was mostly instigated, and sometimes forcibly, by Arab leaders who spread endless scare stories about the likelihood of mass killings by Jews. Karsh concedes that late in the process, the Jews became unwilling to sanction the return of Arabs. But this was a reversal of their earlier policy and could easily be defended as a realistic assessment of the trouble returning Arabs would cause them, granted what 1948 had taught both sides.

The Arabs’ crocodile tears
Karsh stresses, but all historians seem to accept, that no Arab leaders of surrounding countries seem seriously to have been thinking about the well-being of Palestinian Arabs as a cause of merit in itself. What’s more, the neighbouring states often seemed to concede at least privately that it was the Zionists who promised best for the local Arabs. Indeed, it was the Jews who throughout were actually prepared to think of their Arab neighbours as having rights of their own. Non-Palestinian Arab leaders used the Palestinian Arab cause as a chip in their own nation-building, and often in their plans to absorb one bit or another, or all of, Palestine in their burgeoning kingdoms or empires.

And why not, goes the conventional anti-Zionist view? Palestine was and is an Arab, and a Muslim, country. I find Karsh reassuring in his account of Palestine as a territory in which an extraordinary mix of nationalities and faiths have co-habited, with varying degrees of peacefulness, for centuries. Most, including the Arabs, were pretty happy to be a semi-detached part of the Ottoman empire. Even granted the mainstream modern historiography, it seemed reasonable of the British, the League of Nations and the United Nations to have sought in the 1930s and 1940s to design a matching pair of Arab and Jewish states, each according rights to minorities, with Jerusalem as an international city. The British state, in the form of Clement Attlee and Earnest Bevin (Labour politicians, I am pleased to note) ratted on its earlier and honourable view and increasingly sided with the Arabs, not least on account of oil, but also general diplomatic convenience (as it was thought).

The Zionists more than tolerated the two-state solution, but – of course, and typically – the Arabs didn’t fancy an option which took Palestine out of play. Karsh is convincing when he sketches the longevity, continuity, richness and usefulness of the ancient Jewish connection with Palestine. I am trying to get it across that it doesn’t require a specially Jewish perspective to see things from a Zionist point of view. Nor does it require a special sense of Jewish victimhood to think that the Jews have a good claim to a Jewish state in Palestine. An ordinary reading of pre-20th century middle east history might have suggested the Jews deserved a state, and  ordinary pragmatism might have suggested that the region would gain from it.

It is, by the way, at least remarkable that the Arab world and its apologists don’t seem to mind that the Palestinian Arabs’ most senior leaders not only cheered-on Hitler’s Final Solution for the Jewish Problem, but took themselves off to live under the Fuhrer’s special protection for the duration of WW2. You’d have thought the Arab world would cut the Zionist some slack on that account alone.

Karsh doesn’t talk an enormous amount about very recent Palestinian and Israeli history. It goes without saying that the world expects Israel to behave much better than its Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians. As part of that, we expect the Jewish state to bend over backwards to accept any concessions by the Arab side. We expect the Jews to deliver on their promises, and the Arabs to fail to deliver on theirs. At the moment, and it’s a recent development, I’d say that the wider world, even including natural friends of Israel, is feeling that Israel is not being as noble and magnanimous as we expect. Reading Karsh has reassured me that my lifelong assumption was right: the Arabs cocked things up very badly. I have no idea whether enough of their young people will grasp that for history’s vicious circle to be broken.

end

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(1) In the White House and Congress, BP faces horrible criticism. If it really was cheapskate and keen on shortcuts which led to the disaster it will be fascinating to know why its regulators and contractors allowed this risk-taking.

(2) It is reported that various oil giants may swoop and buy BP. Presumably that’s because they think it’s under-priced at the moment, or at least has assets so good they outweigh its dreadful likely liabilities. Maybe other punters will think the same.

(3) We still have almost no idea how bad is the ecological damage caused by BP. The NOAA updates suggest a very small percentage of the vulnerable coasts have yet been hit, so far. The under-water damage is a matter of great (wild?) speculation.  I hate typing these words: I am ordinarily superstitious about anything which looks like discounting disasters.

(4) The US can undertake any energy rethinks it likes, as we all will, and it will still quite possibly want its own oil supplies. Deep sea drilling may well remain an option. This will, tangentially, produce an enormous pressure to scapegoat BP is a wildcard, out of line with industry practice, which can in any case be tightened.

(5) We are in the very early days of what will almost certainly be a ghastly political and legal process. One notices not merely how few people have said anything brave or even decent but also how few have said anything which can be proved wrong. Thad Allen seems an exception.

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Previously I have remarked that if this oil spill was a real ecological disaster (wide-reaching, long-lasting, deeply-damaging), then it would be the first of its kind. Similarly, if it deeply impacted the oil firm concerned, it would be a first.

Apparently changes in the weather and the onset of the hurricane season are about to reveal whether this really has the makings of a huge disaster. After that we probably won’t know how for at least a year how bad the impact has been. The trouble with ecological disasters is that they operate on rather longer timescales than our mass media attention span.

Of course, it is inevitable that at this point the media response would be as it has been. There is, on the one hand, a sort of awed appetite for the potential horror which it portrays as having already happened when (as yet) it has not. There is, on the other, a good deal of sensible comment which tries to keep a grip on reality (say from Bronwen Maddox in The Times). But, weeks into the disaster, I have only heard two people speak accurately as to the damage so far. President Obama (in a rare moment of stoicism) early on told a press conference that the beaches of the Gulf were mostly open for business, no problem. And this morning, an eco-tourism specialist, taking a BBC man for a trip to the damage, remarked for the BBRC’s Radio 4 Today programme how little there had been. The coast had so far “dodged the bullet”.

Quite. The serious damage is up ahead. Again, this spill looks unique. I don’t know of another when there has been so much effort put into preparing beaches for an onslaught of oil. Let’s hope it works. (Here, by the way, is a good site for regional news on the spill: it’s Louisiana’s own.) 

I am pretty sure that President Obama is going to be a big loser from this event. There has been a lot of comment about how the American public expect their president to be a miracle worker or at least an Action Man. He himself says his job is not to “vent” (an unfortunate turn of phrase in this context).  But he has been doing little else since the blow-out. That and scapegoating. I do not know American public opinion well, but it seems to me quite possible that the American public wouldn’t mind if their president manned-up, grew a couple, and had an attitude which showed a little more grace. Anyway, his regulators are likely to be in much the same soup as British Petroleum and he won’t be able to wash his hands of it. Meantime, even self-interest should make him hope that BP thrives: he insists it has big bills to pay.

BP are of course caught whichever way things go and whatever they say. They’ll have to defend their legal and financial patch when the time comes, and be careful not to give hostages to fortune on the way. They have to be genuinely sorrowful and even penitent, as well. Not at easy dance.

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The other day the FT published a letter of mine which suggested that this accident would not “transform” the oil industry, as some of the paper’s writers had suggested. I meant to imply that the mainstream western industry was already serious about safety and that even if regulation and regulatory arrangements were tightened, that could at best be an improvement not a revolution.

It’s been pointed out to me that Tony Hayward, the CEO of BP, himself says that there’ll be a transformation. At the same time, though, he has been criticised for pointing out that he wants to accept all the responsibility but not all the blame for the accident. Frankly, I guess that he has been taking some rather good presentational, diplomatic advice. That is: he needs to seem contrite, be responsive, show he is prepared to learn and lead, and yet at the same time convey the truth that there are complicated realities as to who caused this accident.

I don’t know how slack was the US’s regulation of BP’s operation, but I am tolerably sure that Barack Obama’s characterisation of the oil industry, BP and his own regulatory aparatus will stay unattractive and increasingly look to have been immature and opportunist.

We’ll see, of course.

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(1) Reforming the Welfare State

It’s a long old argument, and Tories have done well by ducking it, but how are we really to get the state to have an optimal (minimalist but efficient) role in guaranteeing rather than providing welfare? Maybe this country really does want and will insist on a state-heavy approach, but I doubt it.

(2) Living with global capitalism

It seems likely that this country faces a long hard economic future in which its appetite for public and private spending is challenged by its difficulty in competing with increasingly successful and aggressive countries all around the world.

(3) Being a world hub of capitalism

It seems very likely that a large measure of this country’s economic success will depend on its being one of the HQs of world capitalism. That will mean that it remains highly unequal and has to be extraordinarily clever in its treatment of financial regulation.

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There are three features of modern politics which mean the old party can flourish. 

(1) A new but fissured politics

The political genius of David Cameron is to have seized the most important single fact of change which lay before him.

For a hundred years, politics has been trench warfare between upper and lower classes, capital and labour, salary and wages, property and poverty, dissidence and dominance.

Tony Blair played several of those themes but helped us abandon others. Cameron has gone further: he has ripped up all the remaining class and collision understandings.

Of course, we now face the challenge and opportunity of a fissured politics in which issues will not be readily herded into neatly opposed platforms.

I can see at least one solution and I have argued for it over several years. It is that MPs will be elected and operate as candidates of this or that party but with an understanding of a range of issues on which they will not be party loyalists.

It is a nice idea that the country is basically centre-right or centre-left and that whoever captures one or other of these can then rule. Under such a dispensation, the extremes of left and right would be lively outliers and perhaps have their own flanking parties. In fact, I think, the country is composed of individuals who hold within themselves a multiplicity of views, and parties look like having to accommodate this degree of fissure. 

The Tories are more obviously, naturally and philosophically a broad church of pragmatists than any other party and should thrive in this era.

(2) Making orderly government out of disorderly politics

David Cameron’s biggest electoral mistake was to fail to emphasise an appreciation of the need to re-establish the institutions and habits of representative democracy. His coalition arrangement now makes it far more likely that he will be forced to operate a serious Cabinet, deploy a reinvigorated Civil Service, and surf a far more lively Parliament.

This is all excellent and in a deeply Conservative tradition of loving the business of government within the habits of mind of an evolving constitution. 

(3) the long Conservative moment

The Conservative party is a device to run a capitalist country which is tolerably fair, free and traditional. It usually loses power because its administrations get tired, arrogant and argumentative. I mean that is a natural party of government, but rightly can’t be given a monopoly of power. The worst hazards it faces are those of single party government and are less likely to afflict multi-party arrangements. 

I have no idea how the future will work out, but I think the country is ready to hear about some version of Conservatism, and David Cameron has found most of the right one.

Looking at politics now, it is Labour and the Lib-dems who have the greater problem in finding a narrative. Of course, it is true that the Tories, Lib-Dems and Labour face rather similar problems in working out what their core vote is and how much their “natural” supporters are an advantage to them.

The good news for the Tories now is that their party has a rich capacity for jiving different narratives, and generating new versions of old ones. It has always found people who get the story mostly right, and it just did.

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I am almost sure the country is in better political and constitutional shape than it has been in my adult lifetime. The political class is in terrific form. There’s a new tone about. The right is free of Thatcherite stridency. The left has elements of Foot-ite Leveller crunginess, but that’s looking like a dying or anyway a minority trope. Caroline Lucas seems a better sort of green than most we’ve seen.

Today, Sunday 9th, we have heard excellent things from John Rentoul, Nick Cohen, Lord Owen, Michael Portillo, David Blunkett. Nick Clegg will with luck match the open-mindedness of David Cameron and has already set an amazing precedent by inventing the Clegg doctrine of the “people’s mandate”, or the “moral mandate” for minority parties in hung-parliaments. The new parliament may be more lively and serious than we have seen for decades. Sure, Labour will face a colossal identity crisis, and the right ought almost to be able to sympathise.

We have probably come to the end of a ghastly 20 years for the right. Our natural party, the Tories, messed things up until giving David Cameron the leadership. (UKIP bled away some of the poison at the price of some electoral damage.) We had to grind our teeth whilst New Labour only governed well, when it did, almost by chance, granted its total failure to play Westminster and Whitehall with any dignity.

True, I think David Cameron has made some colossal mistakes, and not least in failing to make sure he was seen as wanting an entirely different style of government to New Labour’s. Still, as Michael White almost suggested in his TLS remarks on my latest book, Mr Cameron’s Makeover Politics, he may well have plenty of chances now to be an amazing Prime Minister.

If he blows it, someone else may succeed in his place. I mean that the political culture is not likely to fail us.

I am  also hopeful that an entire generation of comedians and broadcast commentators – at least their drearily dissident, and childish, carping style – will also get swept away.

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Thirty years ago, the British accepted with some complacency that  six million Lib Dem voters got a rotten deal representationally. In an age of pick ‘n’ mix consumer choice and identity politics that looks less and less sustainable. Whether in hung parliament negotiations or electoral reform, we are likely to accord the Lib Dems more power in future. The wheels may fall off their wagon as we do so, or it may gather speed.

The Lib Dems face a fascinating dilemma. People like Simon Hughes say the country has a centre-left “progressive” majority but in the next breath has to accept that it has just given the centre-right a clear lead.  

From 2005 to 2010 David Cameron tried to make his party look like the Lib Dems. He succeeded and it is possible to argue that he rescued the Tory vote. But it is also possible to argue that he threw away votes too by seeming too Blairite to head a decent government. Anyway, the Lib-Dems slightly increased their vote too.

Can the Tories ever again get the right and the centre-right to coalesce under their banner? Come to that, can Labour ever get the left and the centre-left to coalesce under their banner? Come to that, will the Lib-Dems become a solid centre party, rather than a protest vote? There is a distinct possibility that when the Lib Dems have real power they will irritate people sufficiently to revivify support for a matching and opposed pair of centre right and centre left parties. 

I don’t think the parties’ leaders will get to choose very much about what unfolds in the medium term. We will almost certainly accord the third party more power. I have high hopes that parliamentarians (I mean individual MPs and peers) will gain authority, and I think they may use it toward fiscal soundness at least in the present crisis.  

I think in the very long haul, the statist welfare state is a dead duck. I think the country will then look more coherently like a centre-right country and that a party or a coalition which will look quite Cameronian will run things. I think it will be circled and harried by parties which represent, inter alia, various regions, civil liberty liberals, unionised socialists, and fundamentalist greens.

There are other possibilities. The country may stay wedded to a statist welfare state. Whether it does or not, Conservatives may still play an important role in running it well (as they often have done historically).

With or without a statist welfare state, Conservatives are likely to be very important in working out what sort of economic policy is workable, both in terms of efficiency and equitability.

I think the big opportunity for Tories – and David Cameron has ducked it for five years – is to build on his party’s reputation for sound government. New Labour delivered its policies in a very shabby way. This is the area where Tories can hit home, and play to instead of suffering from their reputation for pragmatism.

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