Science and the campaigners
This is the text of a paper published (in slightly edited form)
in 'Economic Affairs, the journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs",
Vol 20, No3, September 2000. (Blackwell) See www.iea.org
This paper is an account of why campaigners usually deal with evidence
rather badly.
Campaigners, The Enlightenment, the Post
Modern, the spiritual and science
The campaigners use of science
The public importance of the campaigners' views of science
The First Case: Getting the facts wrong
The Second Case: Environmentalism 'better than conventional science
The Third Case: campaigners and uncertainty
Conclusion
References
'And if the noblest exercise of freedom is the pursuit of truth,
the best equipment for the search is to be truthful. The inculcation
of the practice of truthfulness, no less than the acquisition of
knowledge, is the motive force of our educational system. The student
is here [at the University of Edinburgh] to learn habits of accuracy
in measurement, precision in statement, honesty in handling evidence,
fairness in presenting a cause – in a word, to be true in
word and deed.' Stanley Baldwin [1]
'Ignorance, static and inert, is bad, but ignorance in motion,
as Goethe once observed, is the most terrible force in nature, for
it may destroy in its passage the accumulated mental and material
capital of generations.' Stanley Baldwin
'There is a great gulf between what science says is OK and what
the consumers say is OK: that's what we have to address' –
Co-op spokeswoman on an animal welfare report, and proclaiming consumer
power, on BBC News, 22 May, 2000
Campaigners, The Enlightenment, the Post Modern, the spiritual and
science
In many areas, but especially in what might be called 'Green thinking,
campaigning rhetoric has been very successful in winning apparent
public acceptance and some legislative recognition [2]
. It often uses scientific language. There is a valuable context
within which we can place the campaigners' view of science. The
Enlightenment and its legacy is the set of ideas by which modern
scientists and mainstream policy-makers guide their activities.
The mainstream Western view has had many obvious triumphs, but one
of the greatest is to have balanced the many risks progress must
take against the many benefits it has delivered and will probably
continue to deliver.
When the Baby Boomer generation sought to distance themselves from
the generation which had produced Vietnam and Minimata Bay, Three
Mile Island and the 'Silent Spring of Rachel Carson's prediction,
they naturally reached for a Romantic, anti-Enlightenment view as
a frame for their new, radical thinking. [3] [4]
They do not always say so, since not all of them are vigorously
honest. Besides, many do not know that this is what they are doing,
because they are not always well-read. But when we look at the campaigners'
activities and their statements, it is over and over again fascinating
to see that the Enlightenment is their greatest enemy. If we get
the Enlightenment view of science and of Nature clear in our minds,
we will also have clear in our minds why the campaigners' case is
so often flawed.
As the 1960s gave way to the 70s, 80s and 90s, it became fashionable
to figure a radicalism of a less systematic and certainly a less
leftist sort than had satisfied previous generations of rebel. This
new absence of inherited belief, this self-conscious attempt to
think thoughts which had not been turned into cliches by the right
or the left, was labelled as being Post Modern. The campaigners'
case fits a 'post-modern view of the world [5]
. This is that 'facts have lost their normal, Enlightenment, status.
The 'post-modern view also flies in the face of what philosophers
of the logical positivism school call the 'common sense view of
the world, which is shared by the scientific view. We will suggest
that the campaigners are wrong to share this habit. Finally, campaigners
sometimes identify with a spiritual point of view, which is juxtaposed
by them and others to the scientific point of view. As Prince Charles
has argued, the Green campaigners feel that rationalist science
has over taken the 'inner heartfelt wisdom of the ancients and the
indigenous. [6]
This thinking ignores the triumph of that unique understanding
of the blend of reason and sentiment that characterises the mature
Enlightenment. [7] It is also special pleading:
it is calling for an appeal to a court which requires no reasons
or evidence. This court attends only to a certain sort of prejudice,
one which fits the assumption by the campaigners that they have
a higher vision, a finer purpose, than the rest of us, and therefore
need not obey ordinary rules of debate. In general terms, they feel
a need to motivate and energise people, rather than inform them.
In Greenpeace's words, they exist to 'force solutions, and they
adhere to the 'optimism of the action against the pessimism of the
thought. [8] [9]
Unless they are to be resolutely anti-intellectual, and to follow
campaigners in their cavalier relations with the intellectual, modern
people are boxed in. The Enlightenment and its successive forms,
even including a nuanced version of logical positivism, have established
for us a way of thinking which is so coherent, mature and challenging
that we can say that any radical alternative to it is likely to
be dangerous both to man and Nature.
The campaigners use of science
Science is important to campaigners in three main ways.
The First Case: The campaigners often use conventional, reductionist
science to support the apparently factual element of their case.
We will note that they often abuse these claims.
The Second Case: The campaigners claim that their view is richer,
more holistic, than the normal scientific view. We shall show that
campaigners' own values are a much less sound guide – even
in environmental terms – than those of their opponents.
The Third Case: Campaigners claim that the philosophy of science
supports their demand for caution. In particular, they claim their
own version of the 'Precautionary Principle to be more valid than
views of 'conventional science. We shall show that that is a false
view.
Right away, we can see an important contradiction in the campaigners'
different views of science. The campaigners' views under the first
of our headings above are at odds with those under the second heading.
The campaigners like 'reductionist, empirical, research-based science
when they think it supports their case (say, the Intergovernment
Panel on Climate Change and its work on Global Warming
[10] ) and they castigate it as failing in holism when it does
not support their case, or seems to support risk-taking of a kind
the campaigners don't like. [11]
The public importance of the campaigners' views of science
The campaigners' view of science matters to the public because the
majority of us feel insecure about scientific insight and prefer
therefore to let someone else do our thinking for us. Campaigners
often repeat two mantras. One is that the public trusts them on
scientific matters. This is true, up to a point. [12]
The other is that the campaigners' view of science has seldom been
challenged and must therefore be true. [13] They
are right about the absence of challenge, but not that this validates
their case.
The campaigners' relationship to science matters because the public
to a surprising degree feels that it can rely on campaigners, not
necessarily for a balanced view of the subjects in question, but
for a view which catches values that scientists do not necessarily
capture. [14] The campaigners may not be right
in some boring academic way, but they are 'true, or useful, in a
way which transcends ordinary scientificity. [15]
However, the campaigners never admit to the likelihood that the
public's trust of them may be much more like an insurance policy
than an endorsement. In other words: the public does not trust conventional
science to be right always and therefore it may be 'investing in
support for those who professionally oppose the conventional view.
In this way, they support what they take to be the valuable dialectic
between conventional science and its opponents, without endorsing
the latter as much as the campaigners may suppose. This interpretation
may account for the way industry's scientists are sometimes reported
to be more highly regarded than the campaigners. [16]
To a surprising degree, firms and scientists do not challenge the
campaigners' false claims (they know the debate is so badly framed
that they will soon be bogged down in apparent nit-picking). Very
few of the campaigners' claims are tested in court (claimants and
victims usually present so potent a PR threat that defendant firms
and institutions settle out of court without evidence being tested).
The media seldom exposes them (the media perceive their dissident
role to be anti-state and anti-capitalist, not anti-campaigner,
and have in any cse used the campaigners as trusted sources of investigative
material an d virtuous insights.)
The First Case: Getting the facts wrong
There are few environmental causes which have not been characterised
by misleading information. To state something like the scientific
and counter-intuitive 'truth about a few, picked more or less at
random:
1) Dumping sewage at sea from ships was banned in the 1980s but
it had never been shown to be likely to be dangerous in the UK coastal
situation and, like the dumping of oil rigs in the sea, was just
as likely to be beneficial to the oceans concerned; [17]
2) Recycling of domestic waste by municipalities is seldom environmentally
sound; [18]
3) Low level radiation is probably not a cause of ill health in
the general population; [19]
4) Vegetables are marginally more likely to be 'carcinogenic if
produced organically than 'conventionally (the carcinogenicity of
either is trivial); [20]
5) Municipal waste incineration is probably the most benign of
all currently available waste disposal options; [21]
6) Most rainforests can easily survive profitable logging operations
and many are more likely to survive if logging is allowed;
[22]
7) Asthma is a condition which mostly correlates with affluence
and cleanliness, and pollution enters the picture most often as
a 'trigger to over-sensitised respiratory tracts;
8) Most tap water is at least as healthy as most bottled water,
and passes more severe tests [23] ;
9) Heavy barbecue use is a bigger source of dioxins for most of
us than are incinerators, though militant Greens living in 'benders
probably suffer the most because of indoor stoves; [24]
10) Nuclear waste should be dumped in deep oceans: that way its
disposal would pose least threat to the environment and contribute
to the technology's benign ecological profile. [25]
None of these is an open-and-shut case. Honest argument can be
had about any of them. The point is that no sense can be talked
about them until that honest argument has been had. It is rare.
One of the few ways of charting the falseness of campaigners' claims
is to note the several cases in which the Advertising Standards
Authority has judged against ads which state clearly the heartland
of the campaigners' cases. [26] In adjudications
during 1999 until May 2000, these ranged from tropical forestry
to medical research involving animals, and from Genetically Modified
Foods to PVC. Interestingly, firms advertising in the environmental
area have been most likely to attract ASA criticism when, as in
the case of the Co-op and Iceland, their material mirrored and perhaps
even depended on those of campaigners. When, as in the case of the
Timber Trade Federation, firms criticised campaigners and their
stances, the best efforts of campaigners to complain about their
treatment mostly failed. What is more, these reprimands have been
very near to the heart of the campaigners' cases in question. By
contrast, when firms such as Monsanto have been reprimanded by the
ASA, it has tended to be on mistakes which were marginal to their
case. Certainly, there was an element of inadvertancy, of mild over-statement,
to those few of Monsanto's statements which did not survive challenge
by campaigners. The campaigners' mistakes, by contrast, seem much
more often to involve what can fairly be thought the deliberate
misuse of the evidence they pray in aid.
The falseness of environmentalist claims is not occasional. Almost
all the cases they make depend on unfairness and inaccuracy and
worse, all the time. Some continue for years in spite of well-worn
and unassailable evidence to the contrary. For many years it has
been clear that modern municipal incineration was at most a very
a small contributor to dioxins in the environment and that in any
case dioxins was probably not much of a problem at the levels most
of us come across it. Dioxins are associated with chloracne at very
high rates of exposure. Some very recent research suggests that
at high levels, well above the norm, exposure to dioxins may increase
the likelihood by a few percent of a couple producing female offspring.
[27] But this evidence is of uncertain relevance,
since it applies to people exposed in the past, and exceptionally
exposed at that. Besides, long-lasting as they are, and potentially
damaging as they are, dioxins have become perhaps the most heavily
regulated substances on the planet: present levels and present risks,
whatever they are, will not confront future generations. Yet campaigners
have worked against municipal incineration on the grounds that it
is a major source of a major pollutant.
Similarly, low level radiation from nuclear reactors in normal
operation has never been seriously implicated as a serious source
of harm to the general public. Such harm as they cause would be
likely to be dwarfed by the 'natural radiation challenges they face
and by the voluntary exposure to radiation to medical profession
successfully invites us to undergo. What is more, modern nuclear
industry emission levels are much lower than historically was permitted.
Yet campaigners routinely claim that the industry does, or may quite
likely do, serious damage quite generally, and on a scale they have
not been frightened to compare with the public perception of the
damage done by Chernobyl, which they also exaggerate. [28]
These mistakes are not easily made; they are not the result of
slips. As can be seen from ASA judgements, campaigners often quote
scientific papers. Only those who knew the science well would understand
the degree to which the campaigners' case did not represent the
evidence presented there. Characteristically, a scientific uncertainty,
especially an expression of a potential risk (whether or not one
which is seriously likely, or likely to be serious) becomes promoted
to a horrifying, strong possibility.
The point here is that there is a set of rules in the use of evidence,
and the discussion of evidence, which is understood by nearly everyone
using the English language fairly, let alone those doing science
professionally, and using its more specialist terms. When campaigners
use this material it is encumbent upon them to obey the rules of
fair play, let alone of scientific rigour. They should read Baldwin
(see introductory quotations).
The Second Case: Environmentalism 'better than conventional science
It is sometimes said that environmentalism was the product of a
particular scientific view which was at odds with the mainstream.
[29] This case suggests that the science of ecology produced
a desire for a more 'holistic view, perhaps especially in biology.
This is to say that ecology is, by one definition, the study of
the flow of energy through natural systems. As such, it is about
whole communities, about relationships. Naturally, also, ecology
came across its insights through a face to face encounter between
researchers and Nature. Ecology is therefore assumed to have entered
into the essence, the spirit, of naturalness in a way which conventional,
lab-based, sceptical, science cannot. This point of view believes
ecological insights to be at odds with the technological, often
commercial, sorts of science which universities are supposed increasingly
to be interested in.
Actually, ecology's insights do not much tend to reinforce the
messages which 'ecologism has derived from them. They don't even
reinforce the messages of some of its own practitioners. Ecologism
has always been inclined to stress the fragility, co-operativeness
and stability of ecological systems, whilst from the earliest work,
ecological research shows them at least as often to be robust, competitive
and dynamic. The largely left-leaning pioneers of ecologism had
preferred to see Nature as like a Utopian and socialist republic.
It would be much more accurate to see it is a free-market. It is
not the self-conscious and deliberate co-operativeness of communities
which makes Nature's' systems strong, it is the unthinking opportunism
of individuals. It is true that many communities of species seem
to behave in a very organised way, and seem to be behaving co-operatively,
at least with their own members. But even when they do look as though
they are co-operating, it is important to see that there is only
self-interest and instinct at work, not altruism. What is more,
the robustness of an entire ecosystem usually depends on a larger
piece of competition. Seen holistically, ecosystems survive 'disaster,
say fire, because there are opportunistic species which thrive in
the aftermath of such disruption, just as there are species which
can only thrive after system has 'enjoyed a long period of stability.
All in all, classical economic theories would probably better describe
ecosystems with their uninhibited selfishness than they do most
human individuals and organisations with their moral imperatives.
There are some shibboleths which it is politically incorrect to
question. For instance, the science of ecology is thought to endorse
the idea that there is a quality called biodiversity and the more
of it there is an ecosystem or the whole world, the better. Its
greatest scientific fans do not seem to make a very good case for
biodiversity. For instance, Sir Robert May, the government's chief
science advisor and a mathematical ecologist, bemoans the loss of
biodiversity and yet has published work which suggests that an ecosystem
can lose a good deal of the diversity of species with which it set
out, and yet remain robust. [30] This seems to
be partly because the underlying genetic diversity in the system
may remain high even if several or many of its species are removed.
What is more, in spite of the prevailing cliche of a 'balance in
Nature, and an underlying 'web of life, actually many of the species
in, say, a tropical system seem not to be necessary to it at all,
and certainly not in the quantity each it may more or less fortuitously
boast
Modern ecology is actually the discussion of whether it is simplicity
or complexity, variety or homogeneity, which contributes most to
the dynamism of ecological systems. A growing body of the literature
discusses the surprising robustness and responsiveness of natural
systems. This, paradoxically, is best seen by looking at James Lovelock's
Gaia hypothesis which re-emphasises both a highly Green and a highly
pragmatic argument: man can do his puny best to use, or abuse, Nature,
but he will be brushed off with ease if he oversteps the mark. At
a much less extreme level, writers such as Daniel Bodkin
[31] and Stephen Budiansky [32] discuss the
ecological science which endorses and disciplines a rational, respectful
but large scale use of a natural resources by man.
It is important to emphasise that man cannot for long, or in an
extreme way, be cavalier in his handling of Nature. Nature presumably
has laws and non-negotiable limits. We need the tools of science
and intuition to discover what and where they are and to live within
them. But as man works within Nature and establishes what works
and what does not, the greens are often overly gloomy about what
man can achieve and what damage he may do. The campaigners are often
operating well outside the boundaries of what their own favourite
science, ecology, can recommend. They operate, in short, on prejudice
which may or may not be a good guide but is not scientific one.
In several areas the Green prejudice leads to what may seem a useful
caution, but which is actually damaging to wildlife. Rainforest,
for instance, has been demonstrated to be capable of sustaining
a logging industry which can 'cut and cut again: much depends on
the type of rainforest, the intensity and carefulness of the logging
and the amount of time allowed between logging events. In an ideal
world, in which there were very few people, or no people in need
of timber or income, or limitless economic opportunities beyond
rainforest exploitation, one might argue that rainforest could be
left virgin everywhere. As it is, it may be expedient, even from
a Green point of view, to establish sound, profitable means by which
countries which have rainforest can find economic value in them.
Not to do so will, perversely it may seem, leave them much freer
to regard the forests as being of no value and hence leave them
more prone to crude, once and for all development for other, non-timber
uses. [33]
In the case of almost all African wild animals, innumerable fur-bearing
animals [34] , and Arctic seals, a sustainable
harvest is plainly possible, and legitimising its sustainability
in ecological terms would free us to address, and perhaps conquer,
or squeamishness which alone stands between poor people and a worthwhile
harvest. In the case of whales, a largely phony argument as to the
sustainability of harvesting minke whale off the coasts of Norway,
Iceland and Japan has for years bolstered a 'welfarist argument
against allowing local fishermen to improve their livings by hunting
the animals. [35]
Perhaps curiously, one of the scientific techniques which mostly
obviously has a debt to ecology is 'life cycle analysis. This applies
holistic, systematic principles to measuring the impacts of man's
activities and products. It is fraught with difficulties. And yet
it allows this or that practice to be compared with another. It
also allows a clearer sense of where non-comparable issues and concerns
must nonetheless be set against each other. [36]
In the case of municipal incineration, it is clear from extensive
studies that organised recycling of household waste has never, anywhere
made much sense on ecological, and certainly not on economic, grounds.
That is to say: no municipality has ever been able ecologically
or economically to justify the known and calculated fossil fuel
consumption in collecting and recycling household waste as compared
with handling the waste with incineration as part of the solution
(especially if that is accompanied by intelligent separation of
some materials, and energy recovery). It is hard to compare the
ecological deficit in collecting and dumping household waste in
landfills with either recycling or incineration, since the 'downsides
of landfill are not of the same kind as those attached to reworking
the material, or burning. But it is possible to compare recycling
with incineration, since in both cases the calculus hinges on combustion.
In recycling, there is usually a large energy cost in collecting
waste, and treating it, whilst in incineration there is a small
net energy production. Granted the ready availability of pollution
controls for incineration, the ecological contest between recycling
and incineration is easily won by incineration. That is what the
'holistic evidence shows, but the Greens will probably never accept
it.
Nor will the public, at least whilst the media does the campaigners'
work for them. The mainstream media almost always stress that there
is a carbon dioxide and Global Warming risk associated with incineration,
but without mentioning that those risks are greater with recycling.
[37]
The core difficulty here is that the campaigners have an ethical
dislike of the consumer society, which they associate, rightly in
part, with waste. Seeing paper and plastic in our dustbins, they
cannot enjoy solutions which turn such things into fuel which has
a secondary pre-combustion use as packaging. They need these problems
to be insoluble, except by processes such as recycling which fit
their preconception of what Nature would do if she was out shopping
for her family.
The Third Case: Campaigners and uncertainty
Probably the greatest triumph of the Green campaigners has been
to espouse and colonise a 'strict or 'strong version of the 'Precautionary
Principle to the extent that it is now enshrined in policy. [38]
The Precautionary Principle was conceived in Germany and supposed
that where there was evidence that harm was likely, even if it could
not finally be proved scientifically, a precautionary, pre-emptive
approach should be adopted. But, and this is almost always forgotten,
in official and legislative language and operation, this principle
was one of three principles which, when held in tension together,
could usefully guide policy. It held that decisions about regulating
processes and products should be made, even in advance of final
prove of harm, which erred on the side of caution. But such decisions
were also to be 'proportionate: that is, sledgehammers should not
be taken to smash nuts. And they should be pragmatic, that is to
say they should be alert to economic and practical consequences:
they should not impose unnecessary costs. Thus, in German theory
and practice, the Precautionary Principle was hardly more restrictive
or liberal than the parallel British regulatory language and practice,
as developed in the 1980s, which enjoined the application of BATNEEC,
that is, Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost.
The version of the Precautionary Principle now in place in various
national and international treaties and protocols seldom reiterates
the useful tensions of the triumvirate of principles, and what is
worse, on paper at least it tips the balance in favour of caution
and against adventure. This is achieved in two different ways.
The Precautionary Principle is rightly always assumed to be a means
of putting technology and its proponents on trial, and what is more
of presuming their guilt until they can prove themselves innocent.
But actually, the campaigners' case as much deserves to be on trial.
Can they prove or usefully demonstrate that society should attend
to their caution about progress? What level of proof and probability
would we accept from them?
Even if we accept that technology ought to be on trial, and that
the burden of proof ought to be shifted somewhat toward industry
and the official regulators, we can wonder if we are wise to accept
the campaigners' conduct of the trial. That is to say: the language
legislators have been persuaded to use often seems to allow that
it is the 'possibility of harm which should trigger precaution,
rather than the tougher standard of probability. The legislators
clearly hope that they have left themselves room for manoevre. They
need the restrictive language because they are hoping to satisfy
the calls by campaigners for caution. It remains to be seen if the
room for manoevre will be sufficient to allow sensible progress.
The difficulty here is very clear. It is always possible that a
product or process will do unpredictable harm. Indeed, it is almost
predictable that some unpredicted harm will result from any human
activity. The issue is: where is the balance of probabilities of
harm and benefit? Obviously, a strict and unfettered version of
the Precautionary Principle will always and everywhere allow a crushing
objection to be made to any technology, and especially a new one
such genetically modified organisms.
The Greens have used an argument which supposes that the scientific
tradition will support the strict Precautionary Principle. They
stress, for instance, the fact that no scientists will ever say
that a product or process is safe. [39] The Greens
then go on to say that this is an endorsement of caution. It is
true that no scientist will ever say that anything is safe, since
to do is a) to fly in the face of empirical experience ('shit happens)
and b) to betray the empirical understanding that until an experiment
has run its course, its results cannot be known. Besides, c) there
is the philosophical principle that hardly any statements are definitely
verifiable and those more common ones that are falsifiable often
aren't of practical use. A strict sceptic can disprove almost anything
to his satisfaction. This is especially true of the useful, large
generalisations which it would be helpful to be able to make, such
as 'This product or process is safe, and so on.
Modern philosophers of science such as A J Ayer, Isaiah Berlin
and Karl Popper, have found that falsification is a more workable
standard than verification. [40] Put crudely,
that is to say, a statement is likely to have real meaning if it
is there is some sort of evidence or circumstance that would prove
it false, once and for all. Finding falsifiable statements is a
lot easier than finding verifiable ones. A statement such as 'this
product or process is safe is impossible to verify. To do so will
take for ever, and many experiences of apparent safety will not
be proof of safety everywhere and forever. But it is in principle
easily falsifiable, since any indication of any danger, however,
trivial or rare or improbable will falsify it.
It is safest to assume that all things are logically possible,
and even physically possible, and may happen, except those things
which have been proved impossible. So propositions stand more chance
of making sense and being useful if they are of the sort which are
knocked out of court by a single example. This militates against
generalisations and large theories, which move from limited present
knowledge and attempt to describe the future. It also fits the reductionist
habit of making modest (or vaunting) hypotheses and then subjecting
them to the winnowing process of an assault by attempted falsification.
A likelihood is suggested, and practical experimental and theoretical,
intellectual attempts are made both to reinforce (verify) it and
to shoot it down (falsify it). These are pursued systematically
and energetically. The hypothesis may stand, not as proven but as
acceptable for cautious, conditional and circumscribed acceptance.
This approach systematises humility: everything is open to challenge,
permanently. Knowledge is perceived as conditional.
Oddly, this reductionist thinking is taken by campaigners to be
the height of arrogance, when actually it is implementation of the
technologies which have bountifully flowed from the process which
may or may not deserve the epithet.
The campaigners affect not to understand that all statements about
risk – including theirs - are, like any scientific statement,
only useful if they are capable of verification or falsification.
Otherwise we are prone to make portentous statements which are in
fact empty. Of course, no scientist should ever say a product or
process is safe. But campaigners themselves routinely make claims
of danger which are more routinely fatuous than the remarks of any
half-way cautious scientist. Thus, campaigners' seldom say that
some harm definitely will happen, at or by a certain time. That
would be both a falsifiable and a verifiable statement of a type
which is very easily proved true or false. (Unlike the useless statement
that something or other is safe, which cannot.) Campaigners merely
and routinely say that harm may happen, which is not at all useful
because though it is in principle verifiable, it is so vague it
isn't in practice falsifiable. It will never be proved false. The
campaigners' indefinite warnings are hardly ever definite predictions,
since to make a positive prediction is – like a soothsayer
– to risk being firmly falsified.
When the Greens say, 'no scientist of repute can ever say a thing
is safe, and that 'such and such may be dangerous they have the
difficulty, which they do not acknowledge, that the only interesting
additions to these debates are not negative attacks on spurious
and illusory claims of safety but positive assessments of risk put
as precisely as circumstances allow.
After all, most of these points please logicians and nit-pickers.
In the real world, life has to be lived as a matter, not of final
proof but of likelihoods, and balancing hazard with benefit.
The philosophical thinking which surrounds certainty and uncertainty,
probability and risk, is very attractive and complex, but it has
always foundered on the problem that scepticism is always possible
and usually useless. Philosophers from Hume to Ayer return time
and time again to a commonsense approach. They find the extremes
of their own professional speculations and searches for the incontrovertible
are no more use than ordinary sensible usage of words and the ordinary
practices of people living with uncertainty.
When campaigners say, such and such 'may happen, or is 'potentially
dangerous, we can remind ourselves that are saying very little that
helps us in the gambles we must take and want to take. They are
not saying enough to be useful tipsters. There is good ordinary
language and method with which they can be challenged. This has
to do with inviting them to give us the empirical evidence from
the past and present (the 'form) and to give us a decent call as
to their reading of the odds about the future. Then we can bounce
these prognostications against those of others.
When someone says that something 'may happen, we know that what
matters is their response to the challenge: 'Yes, but are you saying
whether it is likely, probable, or inevitable? Or is it merely possible,
as so much is? What price would you pay to avoid this risk? What
is the mathematical expression of your belief about this likelihood,
in terms of odds? These are gambling questions because gambling
is what we all have to do everyday.
Conclusion
We can apply strict reductionist scientific thinking to campaigners'
statements. We can apply their own 'holistic scientific thinking.
We can resort to the philosophical underpinning of scientific statement,
especially about certainty and uncertainty, which the campaigners
say endorses their version of the 'Precautionary Principle. And
everywhere we find their claims wanting and useless.
References
[1] Stanley Baldwin, Truth and Politics,
On Inauguration as Lord Rector of the University of Edinburgh, 6th
November, 1925, collected in Stanley Baldwin, On England, Philip
Allan, 1927 (and Penguin later).
[2] When I say 'campaigners I am thinking of the
views of organisations as diverse as Greenpeace, Friends of the
Earth, Christian Aid, the informal food writers' coalition against
GMOs, and the Green Party. I am also thinking of their cheer-leaders
amongst writers, people such as Geoffrey Lean, George Monbiot and
John Vidal, and many others. I think of these groups' and individuals'
views as I have read them, heard them broadcast, and often challenged
them directly 'on air. I have come to the reluctant conclusion that
there is a matter of 'sides, and almost of 'teams, now. There are
those prepared to go along with anti-Enlightenment, anti-corporate,
populist 'verities and those determined broadly to stand by the
Enlightenment ideal of progress, including capitalism and formal
representative democracy. I am afraid I must enter a weasel caution
here: I am not attributing any particular attitude or remark or
view to any particular organisation or individual, unless I directly
say so. But I believe that almost all the remarks are true of almost
all of them, and that almost all of them do not stand by the best
rules of fair argument.
[3] For an account of the role of the 'neurotic
Romanticism (as I call it) in the birth of the Post Modern, see
Hartley, Keith (et al, editors), The Romantic Spirit in German Art
1790-1990, Hayward Gallery, 1994.
[4] For a clear and moderate account of the campaigners'
dislike of The Enlightenment, try 'Citizenship, Democracy and Environmentalism,
Module 2 of the AECD (Adult Education for Citizenship and Democracy)
course, written and published by the UK-based Centre for Citizenship
Learning and Action, as part of the Popular Education for Democracy
and European Citizenship programme, supported by the EU, at www.ccla.org.uk.
[5] A brilliant discursive account of this issue
is in Tallis, Raymond, Enemies of Hope: A critique of contemporary
pessimism, Macmillan, 1997 London and St Martin's Press, New York.
[6] At www.richarddnorth.com , in the Enlightenment
Project section, may be found a short essay on this subject
[7] Porter, Roy, The Enlightenment, MacMillan,
1990, and especially Dunthorne, Hugh, The Enlightenment, The Historical
Association, 1991 and 1994 cover this aspect within a general account
of 'The Birth of the Modern, as the brilliantly useful book by Paul
Johnson is titled (Weidenefld and Nicolson, 1991). Hill, Christopher,
The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (OUP, 1965) and
Strong, Roy The Spirit of Britain (Hutchinson, 1999) show clearly
the blend of passion and reason in the birth of The Enlightenment.
[8] "Greenpeace is an independent campaigning
organisation which uses non-violent creative confrontation to expose
global environmental problems and to force solutions which are essential
to a green and peaceful future. Greenpeace's campaigns arise out
of a few simple global imperatives to save our ancient forests,
to protect our oceans' eco-systems, to end nuclear threats, to stop
global warming, to end toxic pollution, and to eliminate the threat
posed by genetic engineering". Greenpeace International ad
for an executive director for Greenpeace USA, The Economist, April
22 2000
[9] See references to a paper by Greenpeace's Chris
Rose in my 'Life On a Modern Planet: A manifesto for prgress, Manchester
University Press
[10] The Friends of the Earth website uses UN
official material as its information source on Global Warming. www.foe.co.uk
[11] ‘"It's about time that science
catches up to common-sense - pumping nuclear waste into the sea
is a public health and environmental catastrophe," said Moglen'.
Damon Moglen, quoted opining against the French nuclear programme,
Greenpeace 1997 press release, from www.Greenpeace.org
[12] See Life On a Modern Planet, above
[13] I can testify to both these sorts of statements
from frequent appearances on radio panels with campaigners.
[14] Public trust of campaigners, which is not
as great as commonly supposed, is discussed in my Risk: The human
experiment, ESEF, June 2000
[15] The CCLA site is the clearest example of
this thinking, but look also at Institute of Scientific
[16] See my Risk: The human experiment, above
[17] My Radio 4 documentary, Greenpeace and the
Zero Option, 1989, looked at this in detail
[18] This case is documented in Life On a Modern
Planet, see above. These and many other cases are well-documented
in www.junkscience.com
[19] See Life On a Modern Planet, above, also
the updated account of nuclear risks in the 'Modern risks section
of my website, www.richarddnorth.com
[20] See Life On a Modern Planet, above and also
the updated account of chemical risks in the 'Modern risks section
of www.richarddnorth.com
[21] See Life On a Modern Planet, above
[22] See Life On a Modern Planet, above and also
the account of tropical forestry in the Third World issues section
of www.richarddnorth.com
[23] Some water risks are discussed usefully in
Mooney, R and Bate, R (eds), Environmental Health: Third world problems
– first world preoccupations, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999
and Morris, J and Bate, R, Fearing Food: Risk, health and environment,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999. Bate and Morris are both associated
with the IEA.
[24] See Life On a Modern Planet
[25] This view has been expressed to me privately
by several of the marine biologists who have researched this and
allied subjects in the past three decades: it is a policy nonstarter
since Greenpeace anti-dumping campaigns of the 70s and 80s
[26] See www.asa.org.uk
– the adjudication section covers all the issues mentioned
here
[27] Lancet, May 25, 2000
[28] See the nuclear risk section in www.foe.co.uk
for a very mild but convincing example of the genre.
'The risk of exposure to radiation from nuclear accidents carries
the possibility of major health impacts. The Chernobyl disaster
has resulted in increased cancer incidence in children, massive
psychosocial damage and disruption, and a cost to Belarus alone
of US$235 billion to 2015. Many of the old reactors in operation
in Eastern Europe are disasters waiting to happen, according to
many scientists. Even in France the Inspector for General Nuclear
Safety has indicated there is as much as a one-in-twenty chance
of a serious reactor accident before 2010. Similarly, PWR reactors,
similar to the Sizewell B reactor in Suffolk, run the risk of a
Chernobyl-type accident. Other reactors in the UK built in the 1950s
and 60s have operated well past their intended lives. Even under
normal working conditions there is the danger of radiation exposure
at every stage of the nuclear fuel chain.
[29] See 'The Nineteenth Century Roots of Ecology,
in Bramwell, Anna , The Fading of the Greens, Yale University Press,
1994
[30] This case is looked at in my Risk: the human
experiment, see above
[31] Botkin, Daniel, Discordant Harmonies: A new
ecology for the twenty-first century, Oxford University Press, New
York, 1990
[32] Budiansky, Stephen, Nature's Keepers: The
new science of nature management, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1995
[33] The Timber Trade Federation submissions to
the ASA, to be found at www.asa.org.uk refer to many sources
[34] See my 'Fur and Freedom: A defence of the
fur trade, IEA, March 2000 and at www.iea.org.uk
[35] Press coverage of the meetings of the International
Whaling Commission's annual meetings refer to the case made by the
whaling countries
[36] See Life On a Modern Planet, above
[37] As a single incidence of a routine habit:
Margaret Gilmour, BBC Radio's environment reporter, Today Programme,
May 25, 6.35 am.
[38] See Risk: The human adventure, above, and
see Risk Management: Science and the Precautionary Principle, Kenneth
R. Foster, Paolo Vecchia, Michael H. Repacholi in Science May 12
2000: 979-981 which also appears at the invaluable site maintained
from Bern by Klaus Ammann (e-mail klaus.ammann@sgi.unibe.ch to join
the list).
[39] Greenpeace's philosophy can be seen in the
following exchange at the recent House of Lords inquiry into GMOs:
"Chairman: Your opposition to the release of GMOs, that is
an absolute and definite opposition? Lord Melchett: It is a permanent
and definite and complete opposition based on a view that there
will always be major uncertainties. It is the nature of the technology,
indeed it is the nature of science, that there will not be any absolute
proof. No scientist would sit before your Lordships and claim that
if they were a scientist at all." quoted in the House of Lords,
EU Regulation of Genetic Modification in Agriculture, European Communities
Committee, 2nd Report 1998-99
[40] Besides the philosophically informed views
of Stanley Baldwin, I recommend Ayer, A J, The Central Questions
of Philosophy, Penguin, 1973 (and subsequent editions) as a comprehensible
guide to the logical philosophy discussed here. It might be useful
to compare a remark such as 'God exists with a remark (quoted by
Ayer, presciently one might think) such as 'The sea will never encroach
on this land. We certainly can't verify the proposition that God
exists and we can't think of what would falsify it either. It's
a useful remark, but it is a metaphysical, not a scientific, one.
The proposition 'the sea will never encroach on this land is scientific.
It is also extremely rash. It will be very hard and probably impossible
to verify, now or ever, as a statement about the future, but is
logically and practically easily falsified by a single inundation
at any time in the future. 'The sea may encroach on the land, on
the other hand, is a very safe and even mealy-mouthed statement.
It is a verifiable proposition in the sense that it will be proved
right if the sea does encroach, but it isn't a very useful proposition
because it makes no prediction and states no likelihood. It is not
a falsifiable remark because (whilst it can be proved true) nothing
would disprove it.
Similarly: 'This is a safe product is a bold but silly statement,
leaving many hostages to fortune. It is often used to reassure,
but verges on the foolhardy. But: 'This may be an unsafe product
is an easy and cheap remark, holding its cards close to its chest.
It is often used to frighten, and verges on the cowardly.
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