Shorts on the British Constitution
The core dilemma of popular democracy (17 November, 2003)
People never respect persons who seek their approval. But that
is what democracy forces "leaders" to do.
The problem with dissing "The Crown" (18 October,
2003)
New Labour's urge to modernise has produced an effect which they
did not perhaps intend. We have drifted away from a convention of
great significance to the British Constitution and our national
sense of ourselves. The convention has been that ministers, policemen,
judges, the whole court system, the postal service, members of Parliament
(Lords and commons), the entire civil service, and soldiers all
serve "The Crown". That's to say, they owe allegiance
to "The Crown". This loyalty, more emotional and even
spiritual than managerial, had the valuable effect of reminding
some very powerful people that they were not the servants of a party
or an administration, or even a state, or the state - but
of an entire nation as represented by its sovereign.
Now, we are to be rid of the Lord Chancellor and his department,
and thus we will lose a great office of state which has always harked
back to a monarchical view of society. That may seem to make sense,
but it is part of a trend by which the body politic is rendered
mundane and secular, as well as less clear. These changes risk diminishing
the sense that powerful people are under an almost mystical obligation
to consider something larger and longer-lasting than the expedient.
Serving the Crown usefully both ennobled and humbled the mighty.
An overlooked reason for liking parliamentary democracy
(8 January, 2003)
It is often stressed that the good thing about democracy
is that it lets the majority rule. It's true enough. But the brilliant
thing about representative, parliamentary democracy is that it allows
the defeated to have a proper role in making decisions. This means
that the minoritiy parties in Parliament are genuinely a part of
government, too. And that's true even though they are not, of course,
part of the Government with a capital "G". A modern problem
(though it would have been familiar to the pre-Twentieth century
politician) is that our system enshrines a special role for the
second major (but minority) party, and we are less sure than we
used to be that this works well, or will work well in the future.
After all, we might see the Tories and the LibDems (or others) sharing
substantial minority votes.
Why locals do not really want local provision of services
(8 October, 2002)
The Tories, libertarians, greens and even New Labour say they believe
in locally-determined provision of welfare services. The idea is
that locals should have a say, and that localities should determine
what suits them. Neither is a serious prospect.
The "democratic deficit" is not the lack of opportunity
of locals to involve themselves in running government: it is their
own reluctance to do so. But they want their own district to be
free of any problem they see any other district, anywhere, is free
of; and they want any benefit that any other district, anywhere,
has. The one is a recipe for central decision-making and the latter
is a recipe for central standards-setting.
Subject, not citizen; customer, not dependent (6 October,
2002)
I want to be a subject not a citizen and a customer not
a dependent. That means: I like the peculiarity of being the "subject"
of a monarchy (something organic, nebulous and almost spritual)
and resist the concept of "citizenship" which makes me
a creature of the state. And I want to be an autonomous purchaser
of goods and services, not a patronised recipient of welfare. The
former ambition is a question of not altering a British tradition.
The latter is a matter of evolving a new one.
Why Britain is not a "pork barrel" polity - unlike
the US or the EU (6 October, 2002)
Our Members of Parliament do represent a constituency,
but they don't expect to do much bargaining with the central state.
They don't "trade" their votes on unreleated matters in
exchange for advantage for their region. This is because party and
personality matter more to them than their constituents. So party
loyalty turns out to be a liberating thing - it frees MPs from slavishly
promoting narrow interests. One of the reason party is strong is
that because the UK does not have "separation of powers",
the majority party in the House of Commons nominates around 100
of its brightest and more biddable characters to be the Government
of the day.
Ends
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